IS " INTANGIBLE" PERSONAL PROPERTY OWNED
BY ESTATES OF NON-RESIDENT DECEDENTS LIABLE TO TAXATION IN
PENNSYLVANIA?
Taxation, defined as a "system of forced contribution to
meet the expenses of the government, whether national or
local," (Hadley, Economics 449) with its important and various divi-ions and propositions, c. g., of subjects and objects,
of fairness, of popular endurance, of net re.-ults, and largely
of" appropriations," is an interesting study, not only to practical politicians, but to philosophical minds-and even to the
taxpayer. To the lawyer in active practice the questions
arising under these laws are not those of governmental theories or of political economy. He is usually concerned to
resist a specific claim made against a particular client or a
number of clients whose interests are the same. The constitutionality of an Act of Congress may be attacked, for example the late Income Tax, the Succession Law of 1898, or a
State statute, as the Direct Inheritance Tax of 1897 in Pennsylvania. Frequently, however, counsel try to show that the
legislation failed to cover the case under discussion; that its
particular facts are not within the language of the law.
Such an attempt has failed in New York and the "Transfer
Tax Act" [L. 1892 c. 399] (an inheritance taxation) was held
to cover bonds and stocks belonging to non-residents and
deposited within the State.for safe-keeping, and also extended
to bank deposits there payable to non-residents (Matter of
Bronson, 15o N. Y. i; Matter of Whiting, 15o N. Y. 27;

Matter of Houdayer, 15o N. Y. 37).
This abrogates by statute, and the judicial construction
thereof, the old and well settled doctrine of the location of
these particular kinds of personal property, (expressed in the
maxim " nobiliapersonamsequuntur,") and a glance at these
New York cases naturally suggests an inquiry into the law of
Pennsylvania. As the point involved turns upon the nonresidence of the owner, we may also consider the case of a
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non-resident trustee of an estate as hereinafter set forth. It is
true that in theory no form of tax is more easily borne than a
succession tax. One who gets his plum without even the
trouble of going into a corner to put in his thumb ought
readily to hand over a small slice for the common good, and
the more remote his kinship to the maker of the pie, or in
case of no relationship at all, the more cheerfully should he
enlarge the piece; but this mental acquiescence is rare. It is
not, however, with the subjective aspect of the matter, nor yet
with the objective advantages based upon the facility of discovery and collection by means of inventory and appraisement, accounting and the vigilance of courts of probate, or
even with the averred unfairness of double taxation, (at the
domicile and also in another State) that the present paper is
concerned. The purpose is to consider two questions which
seem related to each other by the common point of non-residence. They may be thus stated, to wit:
I. Where a person, not residing in Pennsylvania, dies
leaving securities of the kind described (i. e., choses in action,
or deposits of money), which he has lodged in Pennsylvania for
safe-keeping, is any inheritance tax upon these securities or
their transfer payable in Pennsylvania?
2. Where a Trustee or Executor, who is not a resident of
Pennsylvania, deposits in that State for safe-keeping such
securities of the estate of a person who was also not a resident
of Pennsylvania, does the Trustee or the Trust Estate become
liable for annual city taxes in Philadelphia, or State taxes to
Pennsylvania?'
It is believed that both questions should be answered in the
negative; that is, in neither case, as stated, is there any
liability to taxation in Pennsylvania under existing legislation.

I These were recently put to the writer, and they suggested the study
whose results are here given. This article treats solely of the law in
Pennsylvania, For the statute in Massachusetts and its construction, see
Callahan v. Woodbridge, 17r Mass. 595, and cases therein cited, and
generally as to the place of taxation of personal property examination of
the recent case, New Orleans v. Stemple, 20 S. C. Rep. ilo, (with People
ex rel. Jefferson v. Smith, 88 N. Y., 576, and Estate of Jefferson, 35 Minn.
215), is suggested. For this last citation, the writer is indebted to Judge
Jaggard, of St. Paul, Minn.
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The first thought is that the mere bailment, or deposit of
securities, without any other evidence of change of ownership,
legal or equitable, does not alter their status. They belong to
the estate of the decedent in the one case or to the trust
estate in the other without regard to the place of custody.
An analogy may be found in the facts reported in Shakespeare v. Fidelity Trust Co., 97 Pa. St. 173. J. B. Ackley, who
was domiciled in New Jersey at the time of his death in September, 1874, had deposited on August 6, 1873, and at other
times, with the Fidelity Insurance Trust and Safe Deposit
Company of Philadelphia, U. S. 5-20 bonds of the face value
of $17,4co and received therefor a certificate of deposit. He
left a will upon which letters testamentary were duly granted
by the surrogate of Burlington County, N. J., to Ransom
Rogers, the executor therein named. The certificates were
presented by Rogers to the Trust Company and the bonds
were delivered by it to him. Subsequently letters of administration d. b. n. c. t. a. were granted in Philadelphia to James
Shakespeare, who sued the Trust Company for the bondsthe action being trover and conversion. The verdict was for
the plaintiff, but the court entered judgment for the defendant
on the point reserved, to wit, that the plaintiff was not entitled
to recover upon the tacts found. On error the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment. Sharswood, J., said: "There
is another point, which, we think, disposes of the question
upon this record. We do not consider that the United States
coupon bonds, which are the subjects of this controversy,
were at the time of the death of the decedent any part of his
estate in this Commonw6alth. The defendants were the mere
depositaries of the bonds for safe-keeping. They were therefore in the possession of the decedent. He held the certificates
of their. deposit. The defendants were bound to restore the
bonds at any time. It was as if the bonds had been placed in
a fire-proof of the defendants, of which the decedent possessed
the key. In point of fact the certificate was in the actual possession of the widow of the decedent in New Jersey. She
surrendered it as she was bound to do to the foreign executor.
She could not have withheld it. The New Jersey executor
could have sued her, and compelled its delivery to him. The
Pennsylvania administrator certainly could not."
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It is a duty, however, to examine the statutcs relating to
taxation. There are, it may be said, in a general way, three
lines of taxation in this State. The Collateral Inheritance
Tax is one. The taxation of personal property for State
purposes is another. The third is the taxation of real estate
for municipal purposes, the rate being annually fixed by City
Councils, and this is not pertinent to our inquiry.
As a matter of interest it may be noted that there was an
effort to establish a system -of Direct Inheritance taxation by
an Act of May 12, 1897, P. L. 56, but the statute has been
declared unconstitutional: Cope's Estate, 191 Pa. I, and
following cases, id.
The present statute which applies to the first question is
that of May 6, 1887,-P. L. 79, entitled "An act to provide for
the better collection of collateral inheritance tax." It is, in
part, as follows: "All estates, real, personal and mixed, of
every kind whatsoever, situated within this state, whether the
person or persons dying seised thereof be domiciled within or
out of this state, and all such estates situated in another state,
territory or county, when the person or persons dying seised
thereof, shall have their domicile within this commonwealth,
passing from any person . . . . to any person or persons . . . other than to or for the use of father, mother,

husband, wife, children and lineal descendants born in lawful
wedlock, or the wife or widow of the son of the person dying
seised or possessed thereof, shall be

.

.

.

made subject

to a tax of five dollars on every hundred of the clear value of
such estate or estates." Prior statutes of this State, which
are codified in this act, are referred to and compared in a very
careful and able opinion by Judge Penrose, of the Orphans'
Court of the County of Philadelphia: Del Busto's Estate, 23
Weekly Notes of Cases 11I. He shows that the section of
the existing act, just recited, did not introduce a new subject
of taxation. Therefore, decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting and applying those statutes are authoritative in considering questions under the Act of May 6, 1887, the last
legislation upon the subject. The principle of the decisions is
the familiar one that the situs of personal property follows the
domicile of the owner: Orcutt's Appeal, 97 Pa. 179. See
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McKeen v. Northampton, 49 Pa. 5 19, opinion of Agnew, J.,
P. 530.
A striking case is that of the Appeal of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, I I Weekly Notes of Cases 492. A decedent
had been in her lifetime a resident of Cuba. Her will was
admitted to probate in Cuba, but ancillary letters were taken
out in Pennsylvania. By her will her estate was divided
among collaterals. The assets consisted of various municipal, government and corporation bonds, all American in issue,
amounting to a large sum. Held, upon the adjudication of the
account of the administrator in Pennsylvania, that these securities were not liable to the collateral inheritance tax. The
Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court In a per
curiam opinion the court held that the Act of April IO, 1849,
which we have seen to be substantially the same as the present
Act of 1887, and which provided that if any person or persons
having their domicile in another State, territory or country
"shall die leaving real or personal estate within this commonwealth, the said estate, whether real or personal, shall be subject to the payment of the collateral inheritance tax," was
intended to embrace only personal property of a tangible
nature, and not mere evidences of indebtedness which have no
situs, but follow the owner's domicile.
Hawkins, P. J., of the Orphans' Court of Allegheny County,
stated the law and distinguished it in regard to the special
property which was the subject of the claim for tax in
the case before him: Coleman's Estate, 159 Pa. 231. He
said: "The solution of -the question involved in this case
turns mainly upon the application of the maxim that the
situs of personal properiy follows the domicile of the owner.
It was said in Small's Estate, 15 1, Pa. I,that as a general rule
intangible personal property of a non-resident, such as bonds,
mortgages and other choses in action, is governed, as to its
situs, by the fiction of law above noticed, and hence such
property is not subject to collateral inheritance taxation under
the Act of 1887, because not situated in this State. Some
species of personal property, it is true, when used in carrying
on business or for other particular purposes, may have an
actual as distinct from a legal situs ; but the local character of
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the use takes it out of the operation of the rule. And of this
Small's Estate is of itself a striking illustration. Not only
was the 'thing' given employed in a business which was by
its nature localized, but the manifest intent of the testator was
that it should remain in this State. The bequest was specifically of testator's interest, including 'all the property real and
personal, notes, stocks, bonds and accounts,' in a limited partnership organized under the laws, and having its principal
place of business in this State. The value of the property
depended largely upon its continuance here. There was no
reason for its conversion and transmission to the testator's
domicile, and it was given to the surviving partner as such in
specie. The facts plainly made an exception to the general
rule. The actual situs was here, and liability to the tax followed. It is urged upon behalf of the Commonw'ealth that
this case rules the present; but the facts differ in material
respects. The gift here was of an interest in a fund whose distribution belonged to the domicile of the donor."
Orcutt's Appeal is approved in Lines' Estate, 155 Pa. 393.
The language of the statute seems clear. As was said by
Judge Penrose in Del Busto's Appeal, supra,the principle that
. has been
choses in action have no situs in the State"
incorporated in the new statute by express enactment; and the
only property, real or personal, of non-residents now subject
to the tax, is, in terms, declared to be that which has a 'situs'
or is 'situated' in the State, thus excluding, under the familiar
maxim, that which is not so situated. Nothing could be more
significant of the legislative intent to adopt the doctrine of
Commonwealth's Appeal (the justice and sound policy of
which have never been questioned), than this substitution of a
word implying tranquillity and locality instead of the looseand
more comprehensive expression 'being in,' used in the prior
acts."
It is to be observed that in the Del Busto Case the estate
consisted of stocks and bonds of companies incorporated under
the laws of Pennsylvania and doing business therein, and of
cash awarded to the accountant by the Orphans' Court of
Philadelphia. No distinction can be found in the opinion of
Judge Penrose between the bonds and the other assets. Rep-
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resenting the court in banc, he considered the question of the
collateral inheritance tax with much care, and sustained the
exceptions to the adjudication which he had made himself
(proforma)when sitting as auditing judge.
Now turning to the second question, it may be considered
as the following inquiry: If a person must have a domicile in
a State in order to be taxed by it, and if intangible choses in
action follow the situs of their owner, is there any statute in
Pennsylvania which imposes a tax on securities whose paper
evidence (e. g-., bonds, certificates of stock, mortgages, etc.)
are here simply on deposit, the legal and beneficial owners
being residents of another State ? Our contention is not now
against the validity of such an enactment, if it have been made,
but it is that no such law exists.
The Act of Assembly of June 8, i8gI, P. L. 229, must be
examined. By its title and preambles and in its terms it is a
supplement to an act entitled "An Act to provide revenue by
taxation," approved June 7, 1879, and the Act of June x,
1889, and amends the same. It provides a system of taxation
for State purposes and is comprehensive in its provisions. A
number of sections relate to corporations, joint-stock associations and limited partnerships, specifying the reports to be
made to the Auditor-General, the appraisement, the rate of
the tax, the settlement, etc., etc., whith do not bear upon our
inquiry. The first section is in these words, in part: "Be it
enacted, etc., That from and after the passage of this Act, all
personal property of the classes hereinafter enumerated, owned,
held or possessed by any person, persons, co-partnership or
unincorporated association or company, resident, located or
liable to taxation within this Commonwealth or by any jointstock association . . whether such personal property be
owned,.held or possessed by such person or persons . . . in
his, her, their or its own right, or as active trustee, agent,
attorney-in-fact or in any other capacity, for the use, benefit
or advantage of any other person, persons, . . . is hereby
made taxable annually for State purposes at the rate of four
mills on each dollar..
"

The subjects of taxation are "all moneys owing by insolvent debtors, whether by promissory note, or penal or single

218 IS "INTANGIBLE"

PERSONAL PROPERTY OF NON-RESIDENT

bill, bond orjudgment, all articles of agreement and accounts
bearing interest; all public loans, whatsoever, except those
issued by this Commonwealth or the United States; all loans
issued by or shares of stock in any bank, corporation, association, company or limited partnership, created or formed under
the laws of this Commonwealth or the United States or of any
other State or government.
The pertinent words are " . . . held or possessed by any
person or persons, co-partnership or unincorporated association or. company . . . " (a), "resident," (b) "located," (c)
"or liable to taxation within this Commonwealth." The terms
of our second question exclude (a) and (b), and the rulings
heretofore cited place (c) on the basis of the other two descriptions, i. e., liable at the time of the passage of the Act No
new definitive liability is set out in this section. If it be necessary to express the meaning of (c), it may be interpreted to
refer to taxables ejusdem generis with those " resident" or
"located;" or, since subsequent sections apply to corporations organized under the laws of other States or territories,
but doing business or having capital or property employed or
used in this Commonwealth (see Section 5), it may embrace
that class of taxables. An expression of such -indefinite
breadth as "liable to taxation within this Commonwealth,"
should not be construed to create a novel liability. The care
with which property held in trust by residents for non-residents is specified to be taxable, supports the proposition that
there was no intention to tax securities whose owners (trustees or cestuis que trustent) are domiciled outside of Pennsylvania, who have within her borders neither "local habitation
nor name."
Two authorities, though they may be distinguished from
the facts of our present discussion, afford help in examining
the Act of 1891. Lewis v. County of Chester, 6o Pa. 325, was
under the Act of 1846, under which property held by a resident trustee for non-resident cestuis que trustent was liable to
State tax. A testator domiciled in New York appointed his
wife executrix and trustee of property which was situated in
New York. She filed her account as executrix in the office of
the Surrogate, which was allowed and onfirmed and the order
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made that she keep the balance invested and retain the same in
trtst, etc. The trustee was domici!cd in Pennsylvania and her
children, the cestuis que trustent, lived xith her, and for seven
years in the borough of West Chester, in this State. The assets
in her hands consisted of United States bonds, Pennsylvania
State stock, Philadelphia bonds, and bonds and mortgages,
viz., $17,500 in mortgages in Delaware and Maryland, and
$4,800 in mortgages in Pennsylvania. She was held liable for
tax in Pennsylvania only on the amount invested in mortgages
in this State. The ground for this limited liability was that
she held these particular investments "by a personal contract
protected solely by our law." ' As to the bonds and stock,
she was a trustee " under the law of NewYork and amenable
only to the authority of that State. The Act of 1846 does
not extend to such a case, but must be confined to the property she has here, and has subjected to our law by investing it
here:" Agnew, J.
The other case is Guthrie v. Railway, 158 Pa. 433 (decided
in 1893, under the Act of June 8, 1891). The facts are fully
stated by McClung, J., in the lower court (p. 437), but the
syllabus sufficiently presents them. A resident of the District
of Columbia appointed by will as trustee of his estate a citizen
and resident of Penns'ylvania, who kept the securities of the
estate in the city of Washington. The main beneficiary of
the trust was the widow, a resident of Washington, to whom
was given an annuity. All the other beneficiaries were residents of Pennsylvania or were presumed to live in this State.
Among the assets of the estate were bonds, the interest on
which was payable at the office of a Pennsylvania corporation.

I But see opinion of Mr. Justice Field in Foreign Held Bonds Case, Y5
Wallace. On p. 323,. . "A mortgage being there a mere chose inaction, it
only confers upon the holder, or the party for whose benefit the mortgage
is given, a right to proceed against the property mortgaged, upon a given
contingency, to enforce, by its sale, the payment of his demand. This
right has no locality independent of the party in whom it resides. It may
undoubtedly be taxed by the State when held by a resident therein, but
when held by a non-resident it is as much beyond the jurisdiction of the
State as the person of the owner."-Noteprecedingpages 321-322. Here
again, one may turn to another decision, New Orleans v. Stemple, 20
S. C. Rep. I o.
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These were held liable to taxation in this State. The judge,
whose opinion was affirmed by the Supreme Court in a "per
Curiam," said: " In the present case we have a trust created
by the act of the testator, a citizen of Pennsylvania appointed
trustee by him, and all that the court of the District of Columbia did was to distribute the property to the party whom
the testator appointed to receive it. Thus this testator must
be regarded as having voluntarily given it a situs for the purpose of taxation within the State of Pennsylvania. It is a trust
recognizedby our laws,entitled to andreceivingtheir protection."
The necessity for a clearly expressed intent to tax may be
illustrated by the case of mortgages held by corporations,
which were taxable under the Act of 1844, P. L. 486, and
the Act of 1846, P. L. 486; but it was decided in 1887, in
Loughlin's Appeal, ig Weekly Notes of Cases 517, that it
was exceedingly doubtful whether these acts were in force, or
repealed by the Act of June 7, I879,P. L. 112, June io, i881,
P. L. 99, and June 30, 1885, P. L. 193, as these last named
acts did not, nor did any of them, impose taxes for State purposes upon mortgages owned by corporations. This immensely
valuable class of securities so held escaped taxation. It will
be observed that the Act of 1891 fully covers such property.
The per Curiam opinion in Loughlin's Appeal contains a sentence so apposite and sound that it should be quoted (p. 519):
"We do not think it is the proper function of the judiciary
department of the government to impose taxation, which is a
species of confiscation by a strained construction of doubtful
legislation.
. The conclusion is that personal property, other than what
is known as "tangible," which belonged in his lifetime, to one
not a resident of Pennsylvania, possessed by him at the time
of his death, is not subject to the Collateral Inheritance Tax
of the Commonwealth, even though the certificates or other
evidences of the choses in action owned by the decedent's
estate are deposited within the State. Further, if such securities (or deposits of money) are retained or placed here by a
non-resident executor or trustee, there is not a liability to
taxation for State purposes in Pennsylvania.
John W. Patton.

